Fidesz is in bigger trouble than Viktor Orbán

“Fidesz is in bigger trouble than Viktor Orbán,” a former government official told us about the difficulties awaiting the party which ruled the country with near-absolute power for sixteen years, in the coming months. In his view, Fidesz’s fate is far from certain, and it is unclear whether the party will even survive April's defeat. “It may no longer be capable of winning an election,” he said.

In recent days, we have spoken with senior politicians from Fidesz’s leadership—who were active both in governance and in the campaign—about the party’s future. In order to allow them to express their thoughts and discuss internal processes more freely, we granted them complete anonymity. When we asked them about the reasons for their election defeat, several pointed to Viktor Orbán’s responsibility, but they all agreed that for now, there is no alternative to the former prime minister within the party.

Even though they all believe that they need new faces for the party's renewal, they agree that only Orbán can bring this about.

“It's because of interpersonal relationships; no one else can orchestrate the reshuffle", one of them said, adding that Orbán is also the one with access to the money, “his friends” have it.

It was obvious during our conversations that they were all personally shaken by the crushing defeat. This was likely because they couldn’t have possibly imagined losing the election. According to one of them, it was precisely this “hubris, the myth of being invincible” that was one of the reasons for the defeat. Yet, in his view, the 2024 EP election should have been a warning sign, an indication that it was time for a change. But Orbán threw himself into the EU presidency, then he traveled to India, and only after his return, in March 2025, did he acknowledge that there was a problem. Thus, even a year and a half before the election, the general consensus was that “it’s impossible for us to lose.”

Another person noted that due to Hungary assuming the rotating presidency—and especially Donald Trump’s victory in November 2024 —they were fully convinced that there would indeed be peace in Ukraine soon. Since the government blamed the war in Ukraine for all economic difficulties – whether justifiably or not is another question – they had high hopes for this. “When we said that the economy would soon take off, that wasn’t a mistake; we genuinely believed it,” he said.

Now, in retrospect, they are all citing economic difficulties as the main reason for the defeat. “There has been virtually no growth over the past three years, while inflation has skyrocketed,” one person said, adding that part of the problem was that “we bet everything on the auto industry”—which was also a decision made by Orbán. While he acknowledged there was logic to this, it also left the country in a very vulnerable position, which is why he believes Péter Magyar’s government will also have to address the structure of the economy.

Another source believed that this was also the reason why corruption, or – to use Fidesz's terminology – "the accusations of corruption" could be successfully brought in as a topic by the Tisza Party. According to this view, the opposition already campaigned on corruption back in 2022, but it didn’t bother people back then. As this source explained, due to the shock caused by inflation, the sense of corruption intensified both among the masses, and also among the ranks of small business owners—who used to be Fidesz’s main base of support—due to the shrinking economic opportunities.

“Since opportunities were also shrinking at the top, the big players started reaching downwards.”

So those who had their opportunities taken away immediately suspected corruption behind it. “The perception is different when everyone is doing worse,” another one of our sources said. They both estimated that between 500,000 and 600,000 voters may have switched their support to the Tisza Party due to economic difficulties and the sense of corruption.

Just as they essentially blamed these same external circumstances for the "corruption charges" working well, they also blamed them for the lack of change. According to the person who believed that change would have been necessary in 2024, Orbán—who had significantly reshuffled his government in 2022 precisely in light of the international situation turning critical-now opted for stability. Yet if he had made changes, it might have lessened the feeling of stagnation, which all of them cited as one of the reasons for the defeat.

This is also the idea which is being put forward in public. “It seems that 16 years in power was an argument in itself. Even if it had been perfect people or saints who had governed the country during this time—which obviously wasn’t the case—after 16 years, some people would feel they’ve been here long enough to make a difference,” former Minister of the Prime Minister’s Office, Gergely Gulyás said in the most recent episode of the Bayer Show.

It hasn’t occurred to anyone even in the back of their minds that, beyond the lack of change, there may have also been problems with the quality of governance. When speaking on the Bayer Show, Gulyás extolled the government's achievements, and Viktor Orbán has also called for defending these "achievements."

Only one of our sources acknowledged that the difficulties of the past three years might have been alleviated if, during the 12 years before that, they hadn't fueled the economy with procyclical policies—specifically, by driving up demand with the much-touted increases in real wages—to achieve the equally oft-touted GDP growth.

Orbán’s responsibility was also brought up in relation to the party losing young voters. “Those under 40 have a different relationship with the EU,” one of our sources said, while Brussels-bashing was a central theme for the Orbán government. Some claimed that they had been given a signal by the EU in autumn 2025 that they should pull back from this, but they did not, which is likely why it was then made clear that “there cannot be an American/Russian disruptor in the European Council,” i.e., within the body of heads of state and government. Some believe this is why Western intelligence agencies leaked intercepted conversations to the press in the final weeks of the campaign. This made the Hungarian government appear as an agent of the Russians, although our sources in Fidesz denied this.

They all agreed that before they could begin to plan for the future, they first needed to reach a common understanding about the past, but they felt that there was still no consensus on that. An assessment on the reasons for the defeat is to be prepared by 13 June, the date of the party's congress, but some believe it could take them until autumn to reach a common understanding.

In any case, for now, despite his responsibility for the defeat, Orbán is likely to be re-elected as party chairman.

His mandate will be for one year, and some view this as a sort of trial period; by this time next year it will be possible to assess, based on the current balance of power, which direction the party should take going forward.

In an interview with Magyar Nemzet, Viktor Orbán mentioned winning over the radicals as a priority, lest another stronger party emerge on the fringes of the right-wing spectrum. He also spoke about building a movement, a point his chief political advisor and campaign manager, Balázs Orbán, also brought up in an interview with Patrióta. “A movement can be built on enthusiasm, which requires three things: resistance to bad governance, a credible message, and new people,” one of our sources said.

“Enthusiasm is building, to put it optimistically,” said another, who is also banking on the fact that if Péter Magyar’s administration runs into difficulties and people’s interests are harmed, voters may feel that they have been deceived. In his view, building a movement will serve as a way to rebuild the party, because over the past 16 years, it has been entirely devoted to governing.

This is also evident when looking at the party's personnel, because over the past decade and a half, “we’ve been looking for employees.” He agrees that a generational shift is necessary, but this requires a “scout-like” approach; and he believes they should look for people on social media who can authentically represent their views.

Others seemed less optimistic; they believe that even devising a strategy will be a lengthy process. Some have said that they must get used to the fact that after 16 years, they are no longer in control; “we must engage with the government.” Beyond the quality of governance and the state of the economy, the strategy will also depend on the type of public legal order that is established. If, for example, the electoral system is reformed to return to a two-round system, or if it is made more proportional, then it might even make sense for the factions within Fidesz to form multiple parties. Under the current system, however, that would equal suicide.

It could also present a new situation if the president were elected directly, which is something Péter Magyar discussed with President Tamás Sulyok when he officially asked him to serve as prime minister. This would grant a mandate that would, in and of itself, strengthen the office of the presidency. Those who believe that Fidesz’s future is far from decided also feel there is no reason for them to rush. Only one of our sources believes that moving up the municipal elections is a possibility; the others consider it legally nearly impossible. And 2029 is still a long way off.